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ACCOUNTING FOR ACCIDENTS: 
SOCIAL COSTS OF PERSONAL INJURIES 
Richard Gaskins*
This short article places the current controversy over the funding of the Accident Compensation 
regime within the wider context of the original Woodhouse vision of a system that directly deals 
with, and consequentially alleviates, the wider Social costs of accidents and their impact on 
individuals. Gaskins argues that an over focus on the "Programme costs" of administering the 
current scheme risks ignoring the real originality of that vision by focusing simply on the cost of 
providing benefits rather than on reducing the costs that accidents to society and the individuals 
that suffer accidents. 
 
I THE SOCIAL COST FRAMEWORK: TWO LEVELS OF 
ACCOUNTS 
How should New Zealand fund its unique national policy on accident compensation? This 
question has played a decisive role in the evolution of Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) 
legislation since its inception in 1974, having provoked intense debate during the lengthy drafting 
process.1
  
*  Brandeis University (Massachusetts, United States of America).   The author wishes to thank Alan Clayton, 
Grant Duncan, Brian Easton, Don Gilling, Geoff McLay, and Susan St John for comments on earlier drafts.  
Remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author. 
 In addition to political considerations, the funding component must reflect the complex 
time horizons surrounding policy objectives of injury prevention, rehabilitation, and compensation. 
Looming behind this process is the danger that the distinctive no-fault conception will be weakened 
if fault-like criteria control the design of funding mechanisms. Over time, public conceptions of the 
ACC scheme have been shaped by resistance to the apportionment of levies, raising the broader 
question of whether ACC should be seen as "insurance" or "welfare", and what it means to call it 
"social insurance". 
1  Current legislation is the Accident Compensation Act 2001 and later amendments. Texts of major statutory 
versions are archived at Accident Compensation Corporation website <www.acc.co.nz>. A useful 
legislative history from 1974 through the 1992 Act can be found in Ian B Campbell Accident 
Compensation: Its Rise and Fall (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1996). For a review of legislative 
debates surrounding funding, see Susan St John "The Rationale for Pre-Funding ACC" (2009) ACC Future 
Coalition <www.accfutures.org.nz>.  
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Accounting issues tend to mask larger concerns about the complex risks associated with 
personal injury, especially whether and how such risks can be reduced to purely financial terms.2 
For such broader concerns we must revisit the original vision for the scheme, going back to the 1967 
Report of the Royal Commission (Woodhouse Report).3 This Commission, chaired by Sir Owen 
Woodhouse, was deeply concerned with accounting concepts and funding estimates. Its creative 
vision for personal injury was framed in accounting terms, defining a distinctive social dimension of 
costs, as announced in the opening sentences of the Woodhouse Report:4
The Problem – One hundred thousand workers are injured in industrial accidents every year. By good 
fortune most escape with minor incapacities, but many are left with grievous personal problems. 
Directly or indirectly the cost to the nation for work injuries alone now approaches $50 million 
annually. 
 
A Social Costs  
According to these opening paragraphs, personal injuries place a heavy toll on New Zealand 
society, as they do in other countries with similar levels of economic development. These 
aggregated private and public costs, along with society's failure to offset them, provide the 
fundamental reference point for all that follows in this influential report. The "toll of personal 
injury"5 includes a diverse mix of "direct" and "indirect" costs, both difficult to reduce to a single 
monetary figure – although Woodhouse cites estimates for the extended costs of workplace 
accidents. These costs fall initially on what the Woodhouse Report describes as random but 
"statistically inevitable"6 victims, with a series of effects that may include immediate pain, lost 
earnings, loss of future function and reduced long-term economic prospects. The Woodhouse Report 
extends this social accounting model to include the impact of serious injuries on victims' families, 
on their workplaces, and onwards through the social and economic networks in which individuals 
are embedded. Acknowledging the larger network effects of personal injury, with their diffuse 
Social costs7
  
2  For a public policy perspective on accounting, see Anthony G Hopwood and Peter Miller (eds) Accounting 
as Social and Institutional Practice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994). 
 was one of many prescient insights found in the Woodhouse Report, which takes a 
3  New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry, Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
(Government Printer, Wellington, 1967) [Woodhouse Report]. Full text available at Auckland University 
Library website <www.library.auckland.ac.nz>. 
4  Woodhouse Report, above n 3, at [1] (emphasis added). 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid, at [34]. By "Social costs" I mean a diverse range of costs incurred outside the parameters of market 
exchange. This usage includes what some economists call "external costs" or "spillovers" but goes beyond 
the notion of costs modelled as potential market transactions. This broader usage is commonly found in 
German and American Institutional economists, perhaps most notably in K William Kapp The Social Costs 
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whole-of-society perspective that has since found strong support in public health studies of injury 
and disease.8
By 2003 injury researchers in New Zealand managed to assign a dollar figure to this complex 
toll for all personal injuries – somewhere around NZ$6-7 billion per year (in current dollars).
 
9
Responsibility for addressing these costs, according to the Woodhouse Report, belongs to the 
community that participates in the same risk-bearing activities that, taken altogether, generate 
losses.
 The 
toll of personal injury is the sum of Social costs that have already been paid, not a mere spending 
target dreamt up by utopian social planners. It signifies real losses accruing annually, extending 
from concrete victims to their families, to their associates and to the community as a whole, in a 
cycle destined to continue if nothing is done to prevent future injuries of the same type. These losses 
afflict individuals but are spread through social channels of interdependence, as the consequences of 
more serious injuries accrue over time, encompassing past and future victims. These losses have 
already occurred and will continue to occur. By invoking this grim toll, the Woodhouse Report 
established a social accounting framework for assessing the community's combined efforts to 
remediate the damage. It was a heavy deficit that demanded immediate attention. 
10 Remediating these Social costs requires multiple strategies. It means taking steps to reduce 
the likelihood of similar injuries in the future; it means reducing the contagion of loss through social 
and economic networks; and it means countering the impact on individual victims. Woodhouse 
identifies these three strategies as prevention, rehabilitation and compensation, stressing that order 
of priority.11
  
of Private Enterprise (Schocken Books, New York, 1971). In this article I adopt the convention of 
capitalizing initial letters in my contrasting terms "Social costs" and "Programme costs," as a continuing 
reference to these two distinct accounting levels. 
 From an accounting perspective, these coordinated responses from the whole 
community reduce the social deficit raised by the toll of personal injury. Defining injuries as a time 
series of Social costs puts the mitigation emphasis on prevention and rehabilitation, anticipating 
models developed by public health research in later decades. The Woodhouse Report famously 
concluded that removing the compensation process from common law courts and Social Security 
would allow society to address these losses more efficiently. A comprehensive plan for 
compensation and rehabilitation reduces follow-on losses, and it builds an essential database for 
injury prevention. The Woodhouse Report, with its trademark clarity, balances all these remedial 
8  See, among many sources, Robert Beaglehole and Ruth Bonita Public Health at the Crossroads (2nd ed, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004). 
9   For this figure and other assessments of the toll of personal injury, see the New Zealand Injury Prevention 
Strategy website <www.nzips.govt.nz>. 
10  This is the Woodhouse principle of community responsibility. See Woodhouse Report, above n 3, at [5] and 
[42]. 
11  Ibid, at [2]. 
40 (2010) 41 VUWLR 
strategies against the scope of the underlying social problem: in this way the community mobilizes 
resources to meet the toll of personal injury. New Zealand society will never close the gap entirely 
but it can move farther and faster in that direction. The overall vision of the Woodhouse Report is 
built on this accounting model, laying out a policy agenda for remediating the toll of Social costs. 
B Programme Costs  
Today, the accounting issues surrounding ACC are confined to a different level from the one 
just described, played out on the programmatic level of costs and revenues passing through the ACC 
Corporation, which is charged with implementing the mission inherited from the Woodhouse 
Report.12 On this more immediate level of accounting, the notion of injury loss is pegged to shifting 
statutory definitions of entitlements. These costs are more narrowly defined as Programme costs: the 
sum of claims properly filed under the ACC statute and regulations. Statutory entitlements for 
compensation and rehabilitation administered by the Corporation must be funded by revenues 
flowing into Corporation accounts. The balance of claims and revenues must be consistent with 
generally accepted accounting practice used in the New Zealand public sector, which has shifted 
over the lifetime of the injury scheme.13 Going back to the first ACC statute of 1972, entitlements 
under the compensation scheme have always been carefully circumscribed by conditions of political 
possibility. They have excluded a vast portion of the burdens contained in Woodhouse's "toll of 
personal injuries", certainly falling short of the annual figure of NZ$6-7 billion (using dollar values 
from 2003). Some of these burdens are ignored entirely; others are shifted to other programmes 
(health and welfare payments; employers' sickness benefits) and in some rare instances back to the 
tort system. By default, the balance of Woodhouse's "toll" of Social costs remains where it falls – on 
the victims and extended members of the community. Along with these sunk costs, prevention 
policies for future injuries have been slow to develop. The National Injury Prevention Strategy of 
2003 was a welcome step.14
  
12 It is important to distinguish ACC legislation from administrative actions taken by the Accident 
Compensation Corporation. Both the statutory framework and the implementing Corporation are commonly 
referred to as "ACC", but this article tries to maintain a clear distinction.  
 Even then, the announced priorities are narrowly targeted to reducing 
Programme costs, thereby easing pressure on the Corporation's revenues. Only a small subset of 
prevention strategies may be self-funded in this manner. Public prevention policy has yet to address 
the general principle of who should pay the up-front costs of injury prevention. How should any 
proposed Programme costs of prevention be allocated, where the goal is to reduce future Social 
costs of personal injuries? 
13  Donald M Gilling "The New Zealand Public Sector Accounting Revolution" in Ernst Buschor and Kuno 
Schedler (eds) Perspectives on Performance Measurement in Public Sector Accounting (Paul Haupt, Berne, 
1994) 197 at 217. 
14  NZIPS website, above n 9. 
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The problem of costs must be analysed on two separate but related levels. Social costs (Level 1) 
are widely distributed real costs referred to by Woodhouse as "the toll of personal injury" in New 
Zealand. Later researchers have assigned a recurring annual figure of NZ$6-7 billion to this level. 
On this broad level, a diverse sum of costs must be balanced against the combined remedial efforts, 
both public and private, devoted to injury prevention, rehabilitation and compensation. Even though 
we cannot begin to attach a dollar figure to this mitigation effort, it remains well below the overall 
injury toll. The Woodhouse Report articulated this vital social level of accounting more simply and 
elegantly than any other document of its kind. While the concepts advanced by Woodhouse in 1967 
may have seemed elusive, they connect with an entire tradition of institutional economics that 
flourished earlier in the twentieth century. They may also been seen, in retrospect, as anticipating 
concepts that would emerge within the environmental movement, which has developed its own 
literature about environmental costs, sustainability, and "green accounting".15
After setting its discussion within the framework of Social cost accounting (the "toll of personal 
injury"), the Woodhouse Report turned its full attention to remedies. Addressing the other side of the 
balance sheet for Social costs required an inventory of existing remedial programmes, comparing 
those programmes against the accounting target of Social costs and proposing more efficient ways 
to bring these two sums into closer balance. Radical as the Woodhouse proposals seemed, they were 
conservative from a fiscal perspective – striving to remain within the limits of existing remedial 
expenditures, and proposing ways to offset a higher proportion of Social costs through 
administrative efficiency. Maintaining the fiscal status quo was politically important, so that 
Programme revenues for compensation and rehabilitation might continue to flow from existing 
funding streams. Legislative drafters accentuated this conservative approach by importing allocation 
formulas from existing workers' compensation insurance.
 
16
By contrast, the perspective of Programme costs (Level 2) remains within a more circumscribed 
set of accounts, limited on the cost side to only those individual claims allowed by statute. Policy 
debates that focus on this narrower accounting level tend to ignore the reference point of Social 
costs, integral to the Woodhouse analysis of interconnected social patterns. Conventional audits of 
Programme costs and revenues simply compare the costs of claims incurred by the Corporation 
against the levies and taxes collected by the Corporation under its revenue structure. 
 The balance that was finally struck 
between Social costs and remedies moved substantially closer to equality but still remained far 
short. Nonetheless, the direction of change was clearly mapped out, and the appropriate target for 
remedial efforts was brought into sharp relief 
  
15  The Institutionalists were a diverse group working predominantly in Germany and in the United States in 
the first half of the twentieth century. See, for example, John Maurice Clark A Preface to Social Economics 
(Farrar & Reinhart, New York, 1936). A bridge between this group and the later environmental accounting 
movement is Kapp, above n 7. 
16  See Campbell, above n 1. 
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Without the framework principles of Social costs, any gap between these Programme costs and 
revenues brings tactical instability to the ACC scheme, as interest groups vie over lowering benefits 
or raising revenues. Such debates often obscure the larger principles of policy design, which focus 
on broader strategic questions about how to relate statutory entitlements to the higher-level 
definition of Social costs. The tension between these two accounting levels was present at the 
scheme's inception and remains central to the policy debate, if often suppressed behind more tactical 
concerns. Among the suppressed assumptions are the comparative performance of public 
programmes and private markets, as public policy has generally been wracked by the "states versus 
markets" dichotomy. The intensity of this institutional debate may drive both sides to focus more 
heavily on means rather than ends – on the mechanisms for funding the Corporations' existing 
programmes rather than on the Woodhouse goal of remediating Social costs.  
The Woodhouse Report made a serious effort to reconcile accounts at the immediate level of 
Programme costs. It offered practical reasons for building its compensation proposals on existing 
funding streams associated with workers' compensation and motor vehicle insurance, seeking to 
leverage these sources to provide the bulk of needed revenues. It ultimately concluded that a small 
additional sum would be needed from general taxation to raise programme revenues to cover 
proposed statutory benefits. During the years leading up to the 1972 statute, legislators trimmed 
back on the scope of benefits, even to the point of excluding housewives and other "non-earners" 
from the initial statute supported by the National government. These political battles have been 
thoroughly chronicled by key participants.17
Among the recurring ACC funding issues, conducted entirely on the level of Programme costs, 
is the debate between the present funding of future programme costs (usually called "full-funding" 
or "pre-funding") in contrast to annual funding for only those benefits paid out in the same year 
(usually called "pay-as-you-go"). (There are, to be sure, many possibilities between these two 
extremes.)
 The practical need to balance Programme costs and 
revenues, fully accepted by Woodhouse, has tended to overwhelm the more significant accounting 
framework of Social costs. 
18
  
17  The leading insider history is Geoffrey Palmer Compensation for Incapacity (Oxford University Press, 
Wellington, 1979). 
 As our later discussion will show, the main arguments for pre-funding at the level of 
Programme costs seem to abandon the larger framework of Social costs. The Programme costs that 
are said to be pre-funded are future costs of existing Programme entitlements only. As a revenue 
target, these particular costs inevitably fall short of meeting those Social costs, both present and 
future, that fall outside the statutory boundaries of the scheme. Even "fully-funded" revenue regimes 
will never achieve balance with future Social costs. Later generations are inevitably left to 
determine how many Social costs to build into the evolving entitlement programmes administered 
18  Susan St John, above n 1. 
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by the Corporation. At any given time, a pre-funded Programme budget for the Corporation would 
still leave a vast portion of Social costs uncovered, both in the present and in the future.  
II SOME FUNDING PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ASSUMPTIONS 
According to the Woodhouse Report, funding a compensation scheme is one way to remedy the 
accounting imbalance at the higher level of Social costs. As the Woodhouse Report emphasises, the 
toll of personal injury in New Zealand is already being paid – directly, by the injury victims, and 
also indirectly, by those who connect with them through families, workplaces and communities.19
With its primary focus on the remedial strategy of compensation, the Woodhouse Report saw the 
problem of funding as a matter of alleviating the Social costs falling on random but "statistically 
inevitable" victims by shifting them to a broad cross section of the community, whose activities 
support the injury-generating practices of a complex industrial society. Over time, however, as the 
accounting focus narrowed to the level of matching Programme costs and Programme revenues, the 
level of discourse has often reverted to the pre-Woodhouse language of common law and workers' 
compensation. 
 
The policy question is how to shift some of these costs through taxation or levies to support a 
compensation scheme. A similar point arises with rehabilitation services. Less obvious from the 
Woodhouse Report is how the costs of preventing future accidents should be funded, given the 
inevitability that real injuries will continue to accrue throughout social networks. 
Both fields embodied distinctive assumptions about when to shift injury burdens from victims 
onto others, each one posing a different root question. In the common law tradition, cost-shifting 
turned on answers to the question "who caused the injury?" In the case of workers' compensation, 
the relevant question was "who was in a position to prevent (or mitigate) it?" The first question, 
which evolved early-on into the notorious "fault" principle, belongs conceptually to the nineteenth 
century; the second belongs to the first half of the twentieth. A third question emerged out of both 
traditions at about the same time as the publication of the Woodhouse Report: "who is in a position 
to prevent it most efficiently?" All three questions figure heavily in current ACC funding debates. 
The third one, in alliance with free-market advocates, opens the door to private insurance concepts, 
and has posed the strongest challenge to the Woodhouse framework.   
A Who Caused It? (Whose Fault Was It?)  
These questions mark the long development of tort law from the early years of the 19th 
century.20
  
19  Woodhouse Report, above n 3, [59] and [61]. 
 They reflect a moral asymmetry embedded in common law: that injury losses stay with 
the victim, unless the injury was caused by a financially viable defendant. Even this condition was 
tightened up further to require that the defendant was "at fault", that he or she had done something 
20  Ibid, [63] and [68]. 
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wrong in causing the injury. Questions about causation and fault are raised by defendants seeking to 
avoid shouldering the plaintiff's loss: "it wasn't my fault – I didn't cause it – don't hold me 
responsible". Of course, the victims may also be blameless; but under this regime the loss remains 
with them, unless someone else can be found who passes the fault test.  
The Woodhouse Report repudiates this moral framework, which had been riddled with 
exceptions and anomalies during the first two-thirds of the 20th century.21 By the late 1960s many 
commentators across the common-law realm had lost confidence in the fault principle.22 It failed to 
capture the complex causality of motor vehicle injuries, let alone diseases linked to environmental 
sources. It was ruinously costly to administer, mired in fictions and abstractions and subject to 
inconsistent results across similar cases. Woodhouse made at least two significant contributions to 
this growing critique. First, he assessed the performance of common law from the accounting level 
of Social costs. As tools for mitigating the toll of personal injury, common law methods come up 
scandalously short, leaving a large deficit of Social costs.23 Second, based on his analysis that "all 
industrial activity is interdependent", Woodhouse emphasized that personal injuries stem from 
multiple causes, too complex to disentangle and too expensive even if we could.24
Over time, paradoxically, the pioneering "no-fault" New Zealand scheme has evolved to the 
point where all the vagaries of the fault system reappear in debates about funding and levies. A 
scheme that was inspired by clear-headed accounting at the level of Social costs has acquiesced in 
the old common-law ethic, which would relieve the levy payer because he or she did not cause the 
injury – or was not "at fault". The intuitions that haunt this discussion are ancient, of course and can 
be excused as part of human nature. But the dominance of early ACC administration by lawyers 
may have helped perpetuate this style of contesting levies. In recent months, as funding issues have 
moved further to the centre of public attention, New Zealand motor-bikers have protested threatened 
levy increases by declaring that they do not actually cause the serious injuries that many of them 
succumb to. Their message echoes the arguments raised by many other interest groups seeking to 
reduce their levy assessments. 
 This view of 
causation had radical implications for funding the new compensation scheme. Injury victims would 
be entitled to compensation regardless of the cause of injury; and by the same token, those funding 
the scheme could not avoid responsibility by saying: I didn't cause it – it wasn't my fault. 
  
21  Ibid, [82] and [84].  
22  See Terence C Ison The Forensic Lottery (Staples Press, London, 1967); Guido Calabresi The Costs of 
Accidents (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970). 
23  Woodhouse Report, above n 3, at [83]. 
24  Ibid, at [467]. 
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B Who is in a Position to Prevent (Mitigate) it?  
In historical terms, a very different kind of question emerged to address the Social costs of 
personal injury in industrial workplaces. Shifting these burdens onto industry came early to New 
Zealand and spread throughout the industrial world in the early 20th century.25 Historians disagree 
on the motivations behind this movement, but it signalled a growing awareness that the incidence of 
personal injury is governed by collective factors – by organizations, technologies and environments. 
The Woodhouse Report expressed a forward-looking version of this perspective:26
People have begun to recognize that the accidents regularly befalling large numbers of their fellow 
citizens are due not so much to human error as to the complicated and uneasy environment which 
everybody tolerates for its apparent advantages. The risks are the risks of social progress, and if there are 
instinctive feelings at work today in this general area they are not concerned with the greater or lesser 
faults of individuals, but with the wider responsibility of the whole community. 
 
Further evidence for this growing feeling, according to Woodhouse, was the widespread 
acceptance of private insurance, with its capacity to spread losses across vast segments of the 
population. In the early 20th century, businesses had been asked to underwrite comprehensive 
insurance, not because they were the "cause" of workplace injury, but because they were in the best 
position to mitigate it through insurance, and to pass costs on to consumers. But compensation was 
only one part of the larger movement for progressive reform. Industrial safety specialists believed, 
perhaps naively, that individual companies could and would engineer their way to reducing future 
injuries. The basic intuition seems correct that injury prevention requires an organizational focus. 
But the competitive pressures of industrial capitalism made it difficult for any single enterprise to 
invest in safer work conditions, or indeed in safer technologies. 
Shifting the toll of personal injury to those who could prevent or mitigate loss was a promising 
idea at first, but it lost focus as the 20th century progressed. In the case of motor vehicle injuries, 
which posed a crisis at mid-century, the larger safety issues fell to the state, and the trend to "no-
fault" insurance reflected the high cost of trying to allocate burdens according to causation or blame. 
As Woodhouse emphasized, limited no-fault regimes backed by compulsory insurance could 
mitigate only one segment of the larger toll of personal injuries. Many people suffered injuries 
outside of work and off the highways.27
  
25  For a classic history see Ian B Campbell and DDP Neazor Worker's Compensation Law in New Zealand 
(Butterworth, Wellington, 1964). 
 And more strenuous mitigation was needed beyond pooling 
the costs of compensation, requiring also some state-directed efforts at injury prevention. At the 
time of the Woodhouse Report American law was beginning to confront the surge of "products 
liability" claims and some American commentators were looking to collectivize both compensation 
26  Woodhouse Report, above n 3, at [89]. 
27  Ibid, [42], [47], and [146]. 
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and prevention by promoting the judicial doctrine of "enterprise liability" – having decided that 
companies were in the best position to prevent (and mitigate) injuries from manufactured 
products.28 But even this way of shifting injury losses relies too much on the older concept of 
causation. Given the "interdependence" of all industrial activity, the Woodhouse Report argues that 
the problem of injury prevention cannot be apportioned fully to separate industries, let alone to 
individual companies.29
C Who is in the Position to Prevent it most Efficiently?  
 Much can be done to promote safety at the company level, but the oversight 
comes rather from health and safety regulations, not the tort system. 
At nearly the same moment that the Woodhouse Report appeared, a new theory was floated 
among scholars of law and economics, initially following the progressive cost-shifting strategies of 
the workers' compensation movement. Prevention, not cause, was the main focus, but exactly how 
much prevention is warranted, and how can injury prevention be efficiently organized? Among the 
pioneers of this movement were scholars with liberal leanings, including Professor (now Judge) 
Guido Calabresi.30 But the rhetoric of "efficiency" was soon captured by the market-friendly 
political movements of the 1980s, expressed nowhere more purely than in writings by the New 
Zealand Business Roundtable.31
  
28  For an overview see Don Dewees and others Exploring the Domain of Accident Law (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1996) at ch 4. 
 The key point was that injury burdens should be balanced through 
the framework of market exchange. The alleged Social costs of injury should be addressed by 
creating private markets for insurance and risk management. Any government mandates that could 
not pass the ultimate test of market efficiency came under strong suspicion. In practical terms, such 
suspicions tend to strengthen the market status quo. From this perspective it is less important to 
compensate past injuries than to treat past events as financial signals to risk managers, who can then 
decide how much to invest in future prevention. A public compensation scheme becomes an 
anomaly, since injured people should already have purchased first-party insurance. Going forward, 
society should strive to achieve only that level of prevention it is willing to pay for, taking into 
account the scope of future claims, defined by consumer choices in private insurance markets. It 
follows from these premises that risk reduction is an investment decision best left to individual 
companies and persons.  
29  Woodhouse Report, above n 3, at [467]. 
30  Costs of Accidents, above n 22. This work was preceded by several influential essays published by Calabresi 
in the 1960s. 
31  New Zealand Business Roundtable proposals on ACC go back to the July 1987 Submission to the New 
Zealand Law Commission Review of Accident Compensation (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 
Wellington, 1987). The same basic analysis continues in a steady stream of reports and submissions. 
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This analytical approach to allocating injury burdens first entered into the ACC debate in the 
1969 White Paper, which provided the conceptual bridge between the Royal Commission and the 
1972 legislation.32 The White Paper explains the logic of market allocation as follows:33
Some say it is best to make the enterprise producing the accident liable for the risks. The losses should 
be spread among those whose activities create the risk of accidents. It has been argued that such a 
system would be more efficient in deterring accidents than if the costs of accidents are spread 
throughout the community. The idea is that, to the extent that the claims met by the fund result from 
injuries that can be attributed to identifiable activities, the claims should be a charge on those activities. 
 
The Woodhouse Report had expressed little patience for this approach, for all its novelty and 
sophistication. The White Paper logic assigns injuries to specific risk-creating "activities" and the 
individual enterprises that "produce" them. It was a step backwards to causal notions reminiscent of 
common law, combined with the workers' compensation belief that separate industries and discrete 
enterprises could fine-tune their risk-bearing behaviour. By contrast, the Woodhouse Report 
maintained that all risk-bearing activities were interdependent, and that microeconomic calculation 
cannot sort them out. When bikers are seriously injured, should we assign their risk to bike-riding 
alone, or does it not also belong to motor vehicle drivers, to law enforcement officials, and to 
roading engineers? Should we expect all these groups to bargain among themselves over risk-
reduction, and can we trust the market to produce the right answer? 
Woodhouse concluded that payments for compensation and prevention should ideally be funded 
from general taxation, with no further allocational criteria.34 As a practical matter, however, the 
Report found most of the needed resources in two existing insurance streams identified with 
workplace accidents and motor vehicle accidents. The Report was prepared to abandon the elaborate 
classification scheme setting differential workers' compensation payments by industry. A 
contrasting view was expressed at the same time by Professor Terence Ison, whose work is often 
compared to the Woodhouse Report. Ison had absorbed the market-allocation model and feared that 
uniform levies across industries would require the low-risk industries to "subsidise" the high-risk 
ones.35
The market allocation model differs profoundly from the Woodhouse framework. It shifts the 
focus away from social losses, which have already been incurred, and toward risk-management 
 Ison's view was shared at the time by the influential Ontario Workman's Compensation 
Board. 
  
32  Personal Injury: A Commentary on the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand (Government Printer, Wellington, 1969) (referred to here by its familiar 
reference, White Paper). 
33  Ibid, at [205]. 
34  Woodhouse Report, above n 3, [461] and [462]. 
35  Ison, above n 22, at 58.  
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investments that will turn a future profit. Using levies as a tool for managing personal injury rates 
and severity imagines a world in which the risks of modern living have been fully reduced to 
financial terms. New Zealand proponents of this approach appear to accept the ability of private 
insurance markets to perform these reductions. But recent evidence may indicate that insurance 
markets in today's global economy depend on more esoteric financial instruments for managing 
large-scale risks. The recent meltdown of global financial markets suggests how such instruments 
can be overused.36
In retrospect, the late 1960s can be seen as a turning point for personal injury policies. One 
could choose either the political remediation of Social costs, as in the Woodhouse Report, or the 
market management of future risk – which took root within the ACC levy system. The risk-
allocation philosophy introduced in the White Paper, endorsed by the Gair Committee,
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III CONCLUSION: FRAMING THE FUNDING DEBATE 
 and built 
into the early statutes was destined to emerge in periodic disputes about levies, currently distributed 
across six separate levy accounts. This feature of the scheme has fuelled four decades of debate 
about cross-subsidization and distorted economic incentives. The logic of fully financialised risk 
collides with the basic principles of the Woodhouse vision, and it remains the leading source of 
political conflict within the ACC scheme. 
Two competing frameworks stand behind current ACC funding debates, struggling for some 
middle ground in a statutory scheme that has drifted rather far from its original vision. The two 
levels of accounts – Social costs and Programme costs – define the central focus for each 
alternative, each one exerting a distinctive force field within the overall scheme. 
The framework of Social costs pulls the discussion of ACC levies toward the vision identified 
with the Woodhouse Report. Within this framework, the scope of Social costs always exceeds the 
narrower subset of Programme costs. It follows that potential remedies for Social costs would reach 
far beyond the more limited strategies and resources enacted in current ACC legislation. The very 
notion of "social" insurance requires this broader level of accounting. When the ACC statute is 
guided by Social cost accounting, it serves the social insurance principle. Many New Zealanders 
acknowledge this larger mission as the "social contract" background of ACC. In practical terms it 
generally means that ACC entitlements are elevated to a preferred position above those of standard 
"welfare" goals. Seen as social insurance, ACC programmes seek to remediate the "toll of personal 
injury", which presses ever-forward, regardless of limitations on ACC levies and entitlements. 
  
36 See Robert Skildesky Keynes: The Return of the Master (Public Affairs, New York, 2009) at ch 1. 
37  Following the White Paper, the Woodhouse Report was considered by a select committee chaired by Hon 
GF Gair MP (the Gair Committee); Report of the Select Committee on Compensation for Personal injury in 
New Zealand (New Zealand Government Printer, 1970). 
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The market-based challenge to social insurance principles has had spectacular success 
throughout the world in recent decades. This market alternative considers Programme costs as the 
only calculable reference point for public policy; injury prevention and compensation are thus 
constrained by the overriding imperative that all revenues contributing to Programme costs shall 
promote efficient risk management. Safety thus becomes a commodity competing on the basis of 
price with other commodities, regulated ultimately by sovereign consumers.38
This clash of visions summarizes much of what has happened elsewhere in public life over the 
past half-century. From an international policy perspective, New Zealand is important because of 
the Woodhouse Report and its unique eloquence in making the case for Social cost accounting. New 
Zealand is also important because this vision was powerful enough to support large institutional 
changes, including the abolition of most personal injury lawsuits. On a practical level, however, 
these two accounting frameworks now seem caught in a political stalemate, where neither side can 
gain much ground. After nearly four decades, the New Zealand public generally accept ACC as a 
noble experiment; but interest groups still resist their portion of the levies. Whenever governments 
change, these two views seem fated to collide. It is then that political debate resonates with the 
familiar contest of labels: "insurance" versus "welfare," and "social insurance" versus 
"privatisation". 
 Having abolished 
common law actions for personal injury, New Zealand would be in a unique position to implement 
this market philosophy in its purest form, relying entirely on private first-party insurance and the 
free purchase of financial risk instruments. This utopian goal is essentially what the New Zealand 
Business Roundtable has been advocating for more than two decades. To them, any concern with 
Social costs would be mere advocacy for social welfare. 
ACC debates in New Zealand are increasingly dominated by reference to competing accounting 
terms: "full-funding" versus "pay-as-you-go". From the standpoint of Social costs, even the present 
full-funding (or "pre-funding") of future Programme costs still leaves a major portion of Social costs 
uncovered. On this view, pre-funding is an illusion maintained by restricting one's accounting 
framework to the level of Programme costs. As a policy matter, the zeal for pre-funding these 
Programme-limited costs may take priority over the still unfunded Social costs we call the "toll of 
personal injury". When it comes to injury prevention, pre-funding long-term Programme costs 
would encroach even further on the unmet needs of a comprehensive prevention strategy. Rigid pre-
funding imperatives either shift uncovered Social costs to other public programmes, or leave them 
with injury victims, only to leach out further through the extensive networks outlined by 
Woodhouse. To be sure, there have been moments when New Zealand expanded its coverage of 
  
38  The broader theory is presented in Robert Shiller The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005). 
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Social costs, as in the 2005 Amendment adding treatment injuries to the ACC scheme.39
Treating the pre-funding of Programme costs as the supreme goal follows directly from the 
imperative of financialising risk. What matters most, from this perspective, is the mathematical 
relationship between Programme revenues and fully-specified future Programme costs.  To reach a 
balance, one can just as well reduce benefits (especially those with uncertain future costs) as raise 
revenues; the ultimate concern is simply to bring all elements of the scheme within the scope of 
present financial calculation. Before markets can price risks properly there must be a full assessment 
of future liabilities, notwithstanding that future prices are then discounted to present value, and 
reconstructed in accordance with actuarial assumptions. This preoccupation ignores the "social 
contract" aspects of the scheme – or pretty much everything that happens on the level of Social 
costs, including the original vision on which the entire no-fault scheme was based. If the ultimate 
goal is to integrate injury costs into the market calculus of risk management, getting the prices right 
for Programme costs becomes an end in itself. The most ardent full-funders make frequent reference 
to the practices of private insurance, which remains their conceptual standard, as well as the most 
likely policy goal they hope to achieve. 
 To the 
extent one is concerned with fairness to future generations, it may be more important to expand the 
scope of Social costs addressed by ACC – including more injury prevention – than to insist on pre-
funding the limited Programme costs of the status quo. 
Here too the probable outcome is a pragmatic middle ground. Paraphrasing St Augustine, it is 
possible to ask for pre-funding, but not just yet. The difference between 2014 and 201940
  
39  Accident Compensation Act 2001, text available New Zealand Legislation Website 
<www.legislation.govt.nz>. For discussion of the treatment injury initiative, see Marie Bismark and Ron 
Paterson "No-Fault Compensation in New Zealand: Harmonizing Injury Compensation, Provider 
Accountability, and Patient Safety" (2006) 25 Health Affairs 278 at 283. 
 is 
something leading adversaries have chosen to finesse. Pay-as-you-go proponents are willing to 
accept a range of modifications for purposes of smoothing, reserving, and buying peace with 
political opponents waiting to pounce on the next accounting blip on the level of Programme costs. 
Despite the ongoing political stalemate, the significance of current funding debates should be 
understood in terms of the larger clash of principles discussed throughout this paper. ACC has 
muddled through nearly four decades, but the future of the scheme is certainly not guaranteed. The 
world is watching carefully how New Zealanders mobilize their arguments, and how this unique 
system will survive the policy battles yet to come.   
40  Accident Compensation Amendment Act 2010, ss 17, 25 and 31. 
